What is the role of a back-row player?
I mean, when you think about it, it really depends on the situation doesn’t it?
Depending on how you’ve been brought up in the game, you might have very specific ideas for what a back-row player should do depending on the number on their back. Is a #7 always a groundhog? Is a #8 always a big ball carrier? Is a #6 always an offensive breakdown support forward and a dominant tackler?
They certainly can be, yes, but is that always true? It’s not. Everywhere you look in the game you see exceptions to the rule. Peter O’Mahony isn’t really a “traditional” blindside. Ardie Savea isn’t a “traditional” openside. Tom Curry and Sam Cane aren’t “traditional” #8s but two of the best and smartest coaches in the game have been playing them there.
What does this tell us about how the game is evolving? Let’s have a look.
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I do think that the modern game dictates that all of your loose forwards have all those skills if they are to be a complete, effective unit at the highest level. Ideally, all of your loosies will be strong over the ball, big in defensive collisions, effective lead carriers, ruck dominant and lineout options but this isn’t always something that is available to you.
The one key truth about the modern game is that size and power in the forward pack are rewarded time and time again. So, when I see coaches like Eddie Jones and Warren Gatland changing the construction of their back five with quite a bit of success it makes me sit up and take notice because they seem to be approaching the problem from opposite sides of the spectrum.
The use of Sam Cane and Tom Curry as #8s is, first of all, injury-enforced. If England had Billy Vunipola and the Chiefs had a few more traditional #8s in their squad this season then maybe we wouldn’t be seeing this kind of experimentation but the use of both players in that #8 spot illustrates what Jones and Gatland are trying to achieve with different playing resources.
England are playing “Big Ball” and the Chiefs are playing “Small Ball”.
To understand what I mean by this, we have to turn to basketball and the Houston Rockets. If you don’t keep up with the NBA, let me fill you in on what the Houston Rockets are doing right now. Since the turn of the year, they have played with a 6’5″ player – PJ Tucker – at Centre. Centres are normally much taller than this with the average height topping out at 6’11” there or thereabouts but the Rockets have moved away from this player archetype and it’s paid off for them with a more mobile, pace based game that is benefitting their star guards, James Harden and Russell Westbrook. The rugby equivalent of your flyhalf and outside backs rolled into two players.
You can get more details on it here if you’re interested but the reason I bring it up with the Chiefs is that for the first few rounds of Super Rugby, they’ve been playing with quite a small pack, relatively speaking.
Their starting locks for their wins over the Blues and Crusaders were both 6’4″ and their tallest regular back row over the last few rounds was Lachlan Boshier at 6’3″. They have since rotated the 6’7″ Michael Allerdice into their second row but have consistently partnered him with smaller locks who are often repurposed back-row forwards.
Sam Cane has been a consistent starter for the Chiefs at #8 in that time but when we think of his skillset, you’d think that he’s more of an openside flanker, right? He’s 6’2″ and not noted as being a massive ball carrier. Gatland had often paired him with Mitchell Karpik (6’1″) who’s operated like a traditional work rate openside and the excellent Lachlan Boshier (6’3″) who has pitched in with solid lineout work, top-class defensive breakdown work and close range carrying.
Yet, when we look at the Chief’s performances, this lack of size hasn’t really impacted them.
When we look at what I’ve traditionally spoken about on this site, you’d think that this lack of size in the back five would hurt them but the Chiefs are working around that with a sort of “small ball” of their own.
Gatland realised that doesn’t have much in the way of height or noted ball-carrying heavy carriers in his back five but what DOES he have?
He’s got two world-class playmakers in Aaron Cruden and Damien McKenzie that he can play at the same time, a massive set of dynamic, heavy front row forwards – Lualala, Moli, Ta’avo and Samisoni Taukei’aho – and some really hard-hitting outside backs like Anton Lienert-Brown, Solomon Alaimalo and Sean Wainui.
One of the key rules of rugby is that you have to win gainline somewhere and the Chiefs have seemed to have decided that they are better placed to win collisions with their front row and outside backs.
So knowing what we do about the Chiefs, what do we expect from our #8 that you traditionally expect from an #8?
If he isn’t required to make 10+ carries a game – this is balanced out amongst all three backrows in the Chiefs’ system – then what specifically do you need from a “#8” that only a #8 can do?
Control at the base of the scrum?
That would be one, for sure, as Tom Curry found out that one time against France.
Since then, he’s been quite good at that skill to the point where it hasn’t been an issue. Scrum defence is another specialist skill but it’s dependent on the stability of the offensive and defensive scrum. Neither Cane and Curry have been exposed in this facet of the game as of yet.
Outside of the scrum, what does an #8 do specifically if you remove lead ball carrying from the equation?
For the Chiefs, Cane carries a bit more and interacts with the ball at the base of the scrum more (obviously) but other than that he plays much the same game. The Chiefs back row splits the ball carrying between but mostly facilitates the breakdown all across the field so their main ball-carrying weapons in the front row and in the outside backs arrayed off Cruden and McKenzie can attack more freely.
When the Chiefs had a back five of Ardron, Mitchell, Boshier, Karpik and Cane they were incredibly well balanced with regards to maintaining possession centrally and then moving the ball wide through their twin playmakers.
Here’s an example;
The first phase hit Moli with Boshier supporting.
The next phase hit Taukei’aho with Ardron supporting and Karpik cleaning the central ruck.
The next phase hit McKenzie on the swing behind a Boshier and Moli screen and then feeds Mitchell on the flank for a strong carry.
The back five service their heavy carriers in central areas while always cycling out looking for wider gaps to carry in. Anyone of that back five could appear in a wide carrying pod to either carry or support the midfield or wingers.
And the Chiefs’ “small ball” often makes means that their forwards can “cluster” in groups to make the retention of possession on multiphase more secure. You can see it here quite clearly.
The backline and the forwards are quite segmented in this example, with only one forward in a wider position away from the main group.
Five of the Chiefs’ outside backs are on the near side of this image with Karpik taking a typical wide carrying position for a smaller flanker.
In this scenario, you can see what Cane’s role in the #8 jersey is… and it’s very similar to his role on the flank. There’s slightly more carrying, his role on offensive and defensive scrums is different, but everything else about his game is mostly the same.
When we look at Tom Curry for England, his role is mostly the same as Cane’s but in a different overall system.
Curry, like Cane, has an expanded role at the scrum and carrying but everything else about his game is the same – dominant defence, outstanding offensive/defensive breakdown and yes, strong carrying in a balanced carrying rotation. In fact, when we think of Curry and Cane, I think there’s quite a number of similarities between the players from a style perspective.
Both are decent carriers without being elite. Both are occasional lineout jumpers without being elite. Both are dominant defenders and breakdown specialists on both sides of the ball.
Curry shares a back row slow with Underhill – an upgrade to Karpik for the Chiefs – who fills a pretty typical work-rate flanker role for England; a lot of work at offensive and defensive breakdowns and usually a focus on racking up a big tackle count.
Like the Chiefs, England play with two playmakers – at 10/12 rather than 10/15 – but instead of filling out the back five with players who could easily be loose forwards, Jones has gone heavy on locks. He selects THREE locks in the English back five in games where he is concerned about physical dominance. Lawes, Itoje and Kruis.
What does this selection give you? A lot of defensive hitters for when you’re playing without the ball – as Jones seems to be scheming for this Six Nations. It gives you extra power in the scrum. It gives you outstanding lineout options on both sides of the throw.
All of these help to compensate for the easy gain that Billy Vunipola gives you. This is a “Big Ball” style.
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The loss of Billy Vunipola is profound and would affect any team in the world. He’s 6’2″ and a remarkable 130kg which you’d normally associate with big locks or props. Instead, he’s got an 80-minute engine, explosive carrying ability and is a dominant defender and breakdown obstacle.
You can’t replace this guy like for like, so Eddie Jones didn’t even try.
Nathan Hughes, a 6’5″, 126kg #8 is currently fit and available but has not been involved for England this Spring. Alex Dombrandt, a 6’4″, 120kg #8 in good form for Harlequins hasn’t seen any game time at test level.
Why not? Well, I would posit that while these are good players, they are still not in Vunipola’s league when it comes to all the things that he does to an elite level. Tom Curry is certainly not the kind of carrier that Vunipola is – not even close – but he’s not in the side to replace that.
By stacking his side with locks, Jones gives up attacking mobility from a width perspective but he packs central positions with a heavy rotation of able carriers and dominant breakdown hitters.
So that means a further example of backs and forwards separating from each other.
Look at this example;
Underhill is filling in out wide away from the main group of forwards, just like Karpik. George and Curry filled this role too, depending on the position, for the same reasons.
Now you see the role of Joseph and Tuilagi in the same backline. It was especially prevalent off the set-piece. Joseph was selected on the wing but on set-piece he acted exactly like another midfielder.
Both Joseph and Tuilagi are also compensating for the loss of Vunipola and they took a heavier load in ball carrying to cover Lawes in the back row who isn’t a natural lead carrier. Itoje and Kruis are certainly dangerous carriers from close range but they aren’t naturally dynamic ball carriers either.
Combine all three locks in the same starting pack, though, and you have a decent carrying rotation and lots of offensive breakdown security.
Against Ireland, both Tuilagi and Joseph lead the team in carries – 19 between them – and they were levered into position by England’s double pivots with good lineout position and secure possession in central areas.
You can see it illustrated here. Itoje carries with Kruis in support, and the next phase hits Lawes hard to commit numbers. They retained the ball in central areas before releasing the ball through the pivots to Curry in the wide channels.
The lineout was a particular bonus with this Big Ball scheme.
27% of England’s lineouts were successful 5-man schemes featuring Lawes, Kruis and Itoje. That allowed England to load up the midfield with Underhill, Curry, Joseph and Tuilagi.
They even managed a four-man scheme in a great offensive position that brought Tuilagi onto the ball in a dominant position with Curry and Marler in immediate support.
Of England’s 9 lineouts, Lawes took 7 in total. That freed up Itoje and Kruis for a lot of offensive breakdown arrivals – 52 between them – and nine dominant cleanouts each. Itoje also loaded up in defensive situations, both in the tackle and on opposition rucks. Lawes topped the chart for opposition ruck arrivals.
Curry’s game was broadly similar to how he usually plays but he was essentially used as a hybrid between an openside and a #8 – a 7.5. With Underhill alongside him, Jones was able to fully compensate for Vunipola by using locks to segment the workload of the entire pack and stacking two heavy-hitting midfielders in the backline alongside two pivots.
