For context, URC teams regathered about 15% of their kicks from hand across last season. Ireland were up at 22% against Australia — closer to what the very best club kicking/chasing sides (Sharks, Munster, Stormers) manage across a full campaign, which is approximately 18%.

To put it another way, this was an insane, verging on unprecedented aerial performance for Ireland and Australia. A true outlier.

This is a good example launched from a free-kick given at a scrum, approximately four metres inside the Irish half. Prendergast launches this approximately 35m downfield, with a hangtime of 5.06 seconds.

Prendergast launches this approximately 31m into the air, at an exit velocity of around 93km/h — making approximate assumptions on distance and the time the ball was in the air. The ball comes down on Jorgensen at approximately 70 degrees, accounting for the wind blowing against the kick at the highest point.

Does an elite kick receiver take this kick still? Yeah, they do, but the pressure Ireland put on with the chase, coupled with the steepness of the kick, turned a scrum free kick in Ireland’s half into an attacking possession in the Australian 22.

This one, off a goal-line drop-out, was turned into a clean Irish possession in the 22 by Jack Crowley.

This was a shorter-range Garryowen, but it was just as good. Max 21/22m in the air, travelled approximately 20 metres with 4.11 seconds of hang time off the boot, and came down at around 75 degrees. Crucially, this targeted the area that James O’Connor, who looked like a 35-year-old guy who was doing comms last weekend (because he was), would have to defend as the back pin.

The kick was targeted at this specific spot, where it would pull O’Connor into the contest against Mack Hansen, who is Ireland’s best offensive aerial chaser in general, and specifically so in this game. There’s only one winner.

Height isn’t the be-all and end-all of contesting in the air, but Australia’s back field coverage — back three plus the #10 — averaged out at about 5’11” in total, and none of them are what I’d call aerial specialists.

When Australia tried to do the same, they didn’t have the horses.

This lineout play was always designed to be a kick chase. Potter is roughly in line with O’Connor as he takes the ball, with the intent being for the veteran Wallaby to put this high and deep beyond the Irish 10m line.

The kick was the right play, but even wind-assisted, O’Connor only gets three seconds of hang time on a kick that barely travelled 24m vertically up the field, accounting for the diagonal nature of the kick itself.

Australia only managed an approximate 10m territory gain but lost possession.

When you contrast that with how easily and regularly Ireland moved up the field through the boot, the flow of this game becomes easier to read. Here’s another perfect example. Australia exit long down the field through O’Connor. Lowe takes the kick, signals for a chase and then hits another high-bomb into the space behind the Australian chase line.

Why are Daugunu and Jorgensen so far back from that chase line? Ireland are playing into the wind and starting on the left-hand side of the field. Lowe isn’t going to bang this 40m across the pitch with the wind blowing into his face. Even if he was, it’s a bad play to make. None of the chasers on that side would be onside until the ball was a second or two in the air.

So the only play was either long down the left wing to Jorgensen, or a contestable. Which means that Daugunu should have been just halfway between the 10m line and the Australian 22, not guarding the 15m tramline on the 22.

22m gained vertically, zero carries required, and the Australian backfield so far from the action that it barely even counts as a contestable at all.

It’s impossible to win a game of any kind with kicking, catching and coverage like this against anyone, let alone an Irish side set up to play this specific type of game, in these specific weather conditions.

Australia’s dream game-state for this one was one where they held Ireland out physically — as they did really well, almost all the way through the game — but were systemically underprepared for a high-volume contestable game. I think they wanted to kick long, meet Ireland in defensive transition and then mop up Ireland physically around the halfway/10m line with the aggressive, high edge transition defenders they picked on the wings and midfield. I’m sure they expected Ireland to throw up high bombs — that was always going to happen — but not even in their worst nightmares did they expect to only have 6.7% of their catches end in structured transition possession on the next phase.

***

So does this mean that Ireland are back? Have we entered a glorious era of the People’s Republic of Backistan?

It would be comforting to think so, but I’m not so sure. The Wallabies were so bad, almost from the very first possession, that it’s hard to get a read. Even with that, they still had more than enough for Ireland in offensive collisions and the attacking maul when they managed possession inside the Irish 22, which was incrementally more difficult because their lineout was running at 68% on 19 throws.

If you’re not kicking at volume and can’t take the opposition’s kicks, who are kicking at volume, and without a functioning lineout, it’s impossible to win a test match.

You can have a bad lineout and still win if you kick well.

You can kick poorly, but do still win with dominant scrum, rock-solid lineout and counter-jump.

You can’t do both. 

Essentially, if almost every time the opposition kicks the ball, they gain both ground and possession, and you can’t hold just over half of your launch points, you lose every single time.

Joe Schmidt has to own his selection choices that empowered this loss, and hope they banked something useful for their development in the process.

Ireland did what this Irish team almost always do to a team that displays a glaring weakness mid-game — they put them away without too much fuss.

The teams that beat Ireland in 2025 take us out of our comfort zone and away from our muscle memory.

There were more than a few worrying notes; our tight defence, maul defence and offensive collision winning outside of the 22 — but when you can kick almost everything off #10 all night long and expect to get the ball back, that wasn’t a factor outside of a few hairy moments.

The ultimate challenge in the test world in 2025 awaits next week, but that’s for next week. For now, a decent job, done well.