“Counter-transition? Isn’t that just a kicking game?”

Well, yes. But also no.

To say that a counter-transition game is just about kicking is to say that the lineout is just about throwing the ball. Throwing is part of the lineout, an important part, but no more important than the call, the scheme, the lift, the jump, the catch and the shape afterwards. It is part of a wider system.

Counter-transition is the same in that kicking is a key part of it but it’s so much more than that too. At its core, a counter-transition game is based on managing territory but, more importantly, managing the sequence of how a game is played.

In chess, it’s generally agreed, that the player who moves first – the white player – has an inherent advantage over their opponent with everything else being equal. The “first-move” advantage is a very real thing. So much, in fact, that the white player wins between 54-56% of all matches which, when you consider that the white player can be anyone, shows the value of moving first. In the 1965 book Modern Chess Opening Theory by Alexey Suetin it was theorised that “because White begins with the initiative, a minor mistake by White generally leads only to loss of the initiative, while a similar mistake by Black may have more serious consequences.”

Counter-transition is very much the same. When you make your counter-transition play first and well, you play with initiative. The opposition is forced onto the back foot and finds themselves struggling against what feels like invisible momentum, almost, just to get back to an even keel.

Ultimately, the counter-transition game relies on the manipulation of territory through long, infield kicking combined with a high defensive press designed to force the opposition to directly or indirectly give you the ball back in such a way that you can double down on your positional advantage with deliberate on-ball action. When you take the initiative, the opposition has to kick incrementally better than you did to get out of the counter-transition trap. Any mistake when they attempt to do so is a killer – the very best sides will make you pay.

Here’s a fairly basic example of counter-transition working with mid-level positive results.

How is this different from, say, a contestable box kick? The main difference is that it takes place over a much longer distance. A contestable box kick will look to spend 4 seconds in the air but travel fewer than 30 metres to allow for vigorous competition in the air and support around the aerial contest.

Counter-transition doesn’t aim for the ball to be immediately contestable aerially. You can see in the above clip that Gibson-Park is always looking to add a lower, longer trajectory to this kick to buff the distance between the point of the kick and the receipt by the opposition.

The kick is right down the tram line to give a predictable starting point for the transition defence to fill around and the distance between kick and receipt puts pressure on the opposition forwards to get into a realistic position to affect play in the next phase of possession.

The opposition is trapped by the ruck offside line while we are held back by the kick offside line as if it’s a starting line. Our widest back will advance up the field as they track the kick and help to bring our forwards onside as the kick heads upfield.

The aim for our forwards and midfield is to beat the All Blacks to the halfway line. When the All Blacks are behind the halfway line, the transition runners are still incentivised to probe for a 50/22, which we have well guarded. We have to beat the All Blacks forwards to the halfway line so that they have to move through our defensive line to support their transition backs.

If we get to the halfway line and the opposition still has possession but has yet to make contact with our advancing line, we press forward with more aggression to stress them in their territory, force contact on our terms while their backs are isolated from their forwards, who are still making their way back to position.

You can see how it produces stressful scenarios here.

The further we advance on transition defence while the opposition backs are in possession, the more likely we are to force an error out of them. In the above clip, it was a hasty breakdown entry produced because one of the All Black wingers ran into a defensive overload wholly isolated from the forwards who might clean him out.

This was produced by Ireland’s consistent commitment to this form of transition play. Long kicks, structured chase patterns with back-field coverage to match and patience. It’s about taking initiative, squeezing the opposition when you have it, minimizing their potential to take the initiative back and not making mistakes, especially if you’re kicking second in the sequence.

It is a style of play that is not without risk but, when executed accurately and efficiently, the opposition can find themselves playing on the back foot constantly. Just like in chess, it takes bravery and skill to play out of the opposition’s initiative and start your own.

The All Blacks tried to play out Ireland’s counter-transition play with some of their own but they were beset by kicking errors and poor phase play and set piece work when they actually earned the field position they worked for.