Sometimes, a coach will tell you where he thinks the opposition is weak with his selection.

When I saw Scott Barrett in the All Black back row rather than Sam Cane, I thought to myself that Hansen wanted to target the English lineout. I can see his thinking. England’s selection looked like it had only two true jumpers in the pack – Lawes and Itoje – and while they have Curry as a decoy option, I think Hansen will have wanted to use Barrett to choke the English lineout and remove a key platform from them.

What does this mean in practice? It means you’re OK with kicking to touch a little bit more than maybe you would do normally.

New Zealand didn’t kick to compete in the first half or kick to earn a transition, they were way more comfortable with putting the ball out and why not? With three second rows – all legitimate jumpers – in your pack, you can “mark out” England’s primary jumpers and force them to go to their secondary options where you can attack less explosive and less experienced jumpers.

Steve Hansen had an edge pre-game in that he knew that Billy Vunipola and Sam Underhill were unlikely jumpers so he was left with Itoje/Lawes plus Curry, who can jump if necessary but is very much a secondary option. That’s two and a half jumping options. If you know who the targets are likely to be over, say, 15 lineouts, you can, in theory, mark their primary jumpers and disrupt them. It won’t always lead to a clean lineout steal but it will lead to lower quality ball, narrower mauls and a lesser attacking platform for the likes of Vunipola and Tuilagi off a dominant lineout platform. A nice reward if you can get it.

Itoje and Lawes are two outstanding jumpers but with Barrett included with Read, Whitelock and Retallick, in particular, I think you’d back yourself to, at the very least, narrow England’s capacity to attack off the lineout. It didn’t work out that way.

Let’s have a look at an example.

There are two lift units on this throw with a large separation between the front and the tail.

This is the initial “frame” of the lineout, where you can get a read on the opponents’ counter-strategy. We can see here that Retallick, Barrett and Read are guarding the front, with Whitelock and Moody watching the tail. England have put Ben Youngs in the front of the lineout which compresses the All Blacks defensive pod a small bit and he’ll be really important later in this scheme.

As with all lineouts, you have to watch for the Rule of Three when defending them. Looking at the picture above, ask yourself where there are two lifters and one jumper in place for a possible launch. You’d think, with Sinckler crouched in front of Curry and Itoje in a ready position behind him that that’s a possible launch. Vunipola and Underhill are already in place with Lawes at the tail, so that’s a possibility. If you’re an All Black forward looking at this, you’re thinking that this is probably a throw to Lawes at 6 or some sort of decoy play to Itoje at 4.

You can see that the All Blacks are focusing hard on Itoje on this lineout. Read, Retallick and Barrett are all watching Itoje intently.

Even though Curry is visibly trying to sell that he’s jumping at 2 by shoving Retallick and agitating like he’s getting ready to launch, the All Blacks’ front counter pod are betting on Itoje. The All Blacks are actually in a decent position on this lineout but they’ll know how accurate George is at finding Itoje at 4 and that space between the Whitelock and Read will look very much like space that England are looking to target.

But England aren’t finished. They’ll want to break up the All Blacks structure.

You can see how Itoje-focused that the All Blacks are as England shake out their position.

Itoje moves into the previously empty 4 space with the Read, Retallick and Barrett watching every step. Vunipola tracing Itoje’s movements in the receiver position is another “tell” for the All Blacks to notice, as that suggests that he’ll be a target for Itoje to throw to, hand the ball to or even step in to lift Itoje.

All the small moments of this lineout so far – from Itoje’s “open” crouched position, to the built-in space at 4, to Vunipola’s tracing movements – scream that whatever happens is going to heavily involve the Saracens’ lock.

Spacing The Pods

You’ll often see England (and other sides) starting a lineout in one position and then “shaking out” the structure to an open position like below.

They went from having Itoje and Sinckler in crouched lift positions near Curry to being completely open in their body shape and evenly spaced through the line. The All Blacks have followed suit but, in doing so, have increased the space between their lifters and jumpers at the front.

The key men here are Retallick, Read and Itoje.

Itoje has taken the middle space and Read has gone with him, tracking his movements. Retallick – the fall guy on this lineout – is watching Itoje’s hips with Barrett tracking closely in a lift position but without Read firmly attached, they are two disconnected to launch properly. Vunipola is in Read’s eyeline too, which draws him a little further away from his launch pod.

Both Retallick and Read are both marking Itoje and gambling that he’s the man involved in the lineout, rather than gambling on position. They are man focused rather than context focused.

At this point, I’ll remind you of the Rule Of Three – that you usually can’t launch or counter-launch without two lifters in place around a jumper. The All Blacks are looking for England’s trio, and England are trying to make it more difficult for the All Blacks to build a trio.

Itoje raises his hand to start the count – on three- and England begin their scheme. Underhill slides out of the way on Lawes, Itoje and Mako Vunipola execute a full decoy lift at 6 while Billy Vunipola feints towards them before stepping in to lift Curry at the front.

Retallick is completely locked on Itoje and moves away from Curry. Read realises that Vunipola is on a lifting route and, with Retallick sold on Itoje, they collide and England get a free take with Barrett jumping pointlessly on his own. The All Blacks look all over the place here, as you’d expect when they essentially got outnumbered 8-6 in the primary jumping line when Vunipola steps into lift Curry.

But wait, isn’t this a freekick to New Zealand?

Vunipola joins the lineout from the receiver position before the throw goes in and the lineout begins. He was the receiver and, as a result, has to stay 2m from the lineout until the ball is thrown. This should be a freekick to New Zealand, right?

I don’t think so.

Watch Ben Youngs.

George only throws – and it’s incredibly deliberate when you see it slowed down – when Youngs has swapped positions with Vunipola (Law 17.a).

Underhill is providing some action here too and, in some ways, Vunipola’s feint inside is timed to Underhill’s slide out.

Youngs’ covers the swapping action at the front of the lineout with Poite watching. When you look at it, George only throws when Youngs has gone the two metres and fully swapped out with Vunipola.

Lualala, who was guarding Youngs just to fill the space, has been completely removed from a potential counter-launch on Barrett at two, allowing Curry to take the ball clean as a whistle.

Let’s watch it back at full speed.

Perfect.

The little receiver switch between Youngs/Vunipola was a nice little switch in this scheme and England would call back to that move a few times, with the All Blacks now wise to Vunipola stepping in as a lifter.

Look at Vunipola’s brief feint on this lineout, which catches Retallick and Read in the same manner but from a different angle. Retallick is tracking Lawes at the front, Curry’s lift-decoy at 5 drags in Taylor from the receiver position and staggers Whitelock/Barrett.

England got their wires crossed on this very lineout scheme later in the game to gift the All Blacks their only score of the game.

***

The biggest factor, for me, is England’s use of “spacing out” to increase the pressure on the opposition counter-launch is a key factor in their lineout work. They have incredibly athletic launch pods in the likes of Lawes, Itoje, Vunipola and Sinckler that can beat other units into the air.

The key man here is Sinckler, who’s movement lifting at 2, to feint with Itoje at 6 and then lifting Lawes at 4 jumping backwards is outstanding.

He sells Retallick and Read at the front twice. And England get clean possession. Matching England when they go “open” seems, to me, to play into their hands a small bit. Here’s another little example;

Retallick and Read are too concerned with Itoje’s movement to stay in a dedicated launch pod and, for me, that’s a mistake.

I think South Africa could have a lot of success against England’s lineout by ignoring their open schemes and planting a big jumper in between 2 and 4. Every time that the All Blacks matched England’s open shape, they lost an ability to effectively counter launch.

Why? Because when they gave up their pre-built front pod of Retallick, Laulala and Read/Barrett, they opened up the entirety of the lineout for England’s primary jumpers. It didn’t matter that England only had two primary jumping outlets because they had the full length of the lineout to work with as soon as they went “open”.

When the All Blacks kept a solid pod at the front of the lineout, they “cut off” two and forced England to move in less space between 4 and 6. New Zealand’s one major lineout steal came from cutting off two and then marking Itoje in the spaces between 4 and 6.

If the Springboks commit numbers to choke up the front of the lineout and time a few jumps purely on George’s throw rather than looking for cues from Itoje, then they can limit the English lineout far more effectively, in my opinion. If they can do that, the Boks have a way to limit much of England’s attacking platform.

We’ll see how they do soon enough.