Who wouldn’t be tempted to not think too much about this game?
Ireland will win it – no, really – and move onto Samoa, where we’ll likely win too and eventually find out who we’re playing in the quarter-final but that isn’t what’s important. What’s important is the manner of the wins to come. Saturday’s loss to Japan didn’t kill our tournament but it did wash away a lot of the credit earned over the last few years. Part of me even thinks that’ll be a good thing in the long run but the reality is that we’re at a point where two bonus-point wins in the next two games are the only acceptable outcome for this squad.
And labouring to a bonus-point win won’t be anywhere close to good enough.
Green Eye Report :: Russia (N)
The Green Eye Report is where I rate the opposition (and Ireland) as a whole in a World Rugby context as first choice units and then, depending on the how far away both Ireland and the opposition are from what I would consider “full strength” and how the teams actually taking the field rate against each other.
S – Elite level
A – Good World Level
B – Average World Level
C – Poor World Level
Rugby World Cup 2019 :: Ireland vs Russia
Full Strength Red Eye Rating: Ireland (S) / Russia (D)
Teamsheet Adjusted Red Eye Rating: Ireland (A-) / Russia (D)
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I’ve rated Russia below Japan in this metric. I still rate Japan as being a low-level international side, despite the weekend’s result, and I truly believe that when they’re refereed the same as their Tier 1 opposition they’ll find it incredibly difficult to duplicate last weekend’s shock.
As for Russia, I’d be comfortable saying that they are the worst side in the tournament. That sounds harsh but they’re only in Japan at all because Belgium, Spain and Romania all fielded ineligible players during qualification, leaving the Russians to almost stumble into the World Cup.
Their results to date have reflected their level. 30 points conceded against Japan. 34 conceded against Samoa. Ireland should be sticking 50+ points on them and it’s as simple as that.
Where do you start attacking Russia? There are no wrong answers. We should have a distinct advantage all over the field from multi-phase play to transition to the set-piece.
One area that consistently stood out to me when watching Russia’s last two games was their lack of structure and attention to detail around the fringes of defensive rucks and mauls. There are easy gains four-plus phases into a multiphase sequence, on the second or third phase off the set-piece and almost immediately around the side of mauls and scrums.
Is it a problem with the defensive decision making under cardio stress? Yes. Can Ireland generate these situations early and often? Yes.
Let’s have a look.
First, what am I talking about by poor ruck fringe defence? Here’s a good example;
This is a common picture for lower-tier teams. On a centre field ruck position like this, you’d want more connection between the midfield “hitters” and your pillar defender but often, lower-tier teams put a lot more stock in good line speed and defensive aggression over formal defensive ruck structures. They don’t mean to do it, obviously, and they’re certainly not coached to do it, but lower-tier players tend to want to fan out and number up on the opposition.
For me, on a central position like this, you’d want those three defenders closer to the pillar defenders, especially on a play like this where Samoa have overloaded one side.
This is where I’d like those defenders to be.
Closer to the pillar defender and able to push up and out from a centre-field ruck, rather than lining up straight on the opposition pod and able to file across the field to man the position
With the gap we see here, it gives a lot of opportunities to a darting scrumhalf – like Luke McGrath – to attack the fringes off the cuff or in more planned schemes.
This spacing problem shows up again and again when you watch Russia over the last few games, especially when they go deep into a multiphase defensive set or into the latter parts of the first/second half.
So – what do we see consistently from Russia?
- Poor defensive ruck structures – A/B/C
- Poor lateral cover around the fringes because of the poor athletic ability of Russian tight-five forwards usually tasked with guarding those fringes.
- Large separation between midfield hitters and inside defenders.
- A tendency to overload the openside in the aftermath of a set-piece.
So how do Ireland attack this?
I think the key to multi-phase play and the aftermath of setpiece is in the below GIF. Watch the space that develops next to the ruck after the ball is passed away.
Disorganised, leggy and gaps everywhere.
There’s around 10m of space to attack here. So what do we do? I’d want to smuggle my fastest strike runners – one of Earls, Ringrose, Conway – behind the original ruck. We’ll want this after a few rucks so let’s say we get to phase three/four; we’ll need to have this in mind. Our target is to build this attack just outside the 22 and close enough to centre-field so the Russians have to make a decision on defending both sides of the ruck.
Earls (#11) will lurk behind the ruck, with enough lateral distance between McGrath to sell that he’s a creative handler for Ringrose and Kearney.
A heavy pod of Kilcoyne, Kleyn and Ruddock will stand off Sexton to draw out the Russian hitters. We’ll need to separate them from the inside ruck defenders so Kilcoyne – our most dynamic ball carrier – will have to be in the middle of this pod with two heavy latchers behind them. The Russians have to fear a big gainline loss.
Bundee Aki (#12) will ensure his line after the ball leaves cuts out the covering forward. We pass to Sexton. On the pass, Earls breaks from behind the ruck to arc inside McGrath will trail the ball to hold the inside defender and keep him off Sexton. Sexton will run diagonally out to help overload our “A” defender (Red #1).
Sexton pops the ball inside to Earls, who can pick the space beside the ruck and attack Artemyev, who can be slow to cover inside. McGrath will trail behind and drift opposite Earls line for a supporting pass.
We’ve used gimmicks similar to this before, but they’ll have real value here. Conway, Ringrose, Earls and Kearney could have excellent games in these scenarios.
I’d look for Ireland to attack the Russian break from the scrum too. Russia go really hard on their loosehead side so, if we can squeeze them there (and they’ll fancy having a cut off John Ryan) we can go after their openside/#8 break. Something like this from 2018 would do the trick nicely, especially with Earls and Ringrose in the same backfield.
Look at Sexton’s hard support angle.By the same principle, there’ll be plenty of space up the side of mauls too. Russia tend to overcommit on the infield side of mauls that get built near the tail, so look for some blindside winger inside cuts off a break from someone like Murphy here too.
This one targeted Gadzhiev on the break. He loves a hit so you can always draw him out of mauls and scrums before attacking inside, as Samoa did here.
Kicking to their backfield will have value too. None of them are particularly good under the high ball r at kicking back in turn. Conway could have a field day under box kicks but there’ll be consistent opportunities on kick returns that target the opposite side of the pitch to the kick first and then, if there’s no break, coming back inside as described above. Their forwards will consistently struggle to readjust when there are multiple transitions.
