Rugby is a game about space.
Who takes it and who makes it. The battle between attack and defence in Rugby Union is a perfect example of taking and making space, with the recent Super Rugby final being a perfect illustration. The Crusaders adapted on the field to the picture that was being presented to them by the Jaguares defence was really something, and it showed the brains and skill set of the Crusaders halfbacks Hall, Drummond and Mo’unga.
To understand what the Crusaders did, we first have to look at the defensive pressure that Los Jaguares brought on them in the first quarter to see what forced the change in tactics.
This is just one example of the Jaguares high line blitz, which itself plays into their counter-attacking style. There are 12 defenders in the primary as a general rule, with the fullback patrolling the space behind the line and both wings stacking close behind the last edge defender.
This is the general set up for the Jaguares and it’s a growing trend in the game. It allows you to keep backfield coverage while being in a position to step up into the primary line.
This kind of system puts a lot of pressure on two parts of your defensive game; numbers management in the tackle area of the primary line and the decision making and pace of the covering backfield wingers on the flank.
You can see the basics of their system here;
When Jaguares lose two men to the tackle in centre-field, the Jaguares backfield adjusts their positioning to cover.
The fullback (or the central backfield defender) will cycle to the flank while the left winger will drop back to a half central position to give him a chance to step back up to the edge if needed.
Once Moroni saw two primary line defenders get taken out in the contact area, that was his cue to shoot up into the line outside of the Crusaders’ attack pod. You’ll notice in all of these clips that the Crusaders are playing really flat off the previous ruck.
That’s pretty standard for the Crusaders, as it pairs their very decent forward heavy carriers with their handling and offloading ability on the gain line to make devastating linebreaks. This style is built on Hall’s excellent pass – one of the most underrated in the game, in my opinion – and his ability to hit wide pod runners creates the kind of short angles that the Crusaders love to play off. The thing is, though, is that playing this flat can sometimes be very risky against sides with good line speed consistency. The Jaguares have an incredibly mobile and organised primary defensive line so they were really squeezing the space in front of the Crusaders’ pods in the early going of this game. Here’s an excellent example.
There is no let up on that pressure. The Crusaders are playing tight on the gain line with that pullback but Los Jaguares are swimming through the screens, making tackles, targeting the ball and forcing errors in the greasy conditions.
Again though, you can see the movement of Jaguares system.
Moyano (far wing) is up in the primary line because the play has surged his way. Moroni (near wing) drops back into the backfield while the fullback drifts into the area behind the defensive edge to cover any chips or grubbers.
Even a team as good as the Crusaders will struggle under this kind of consistently excellent line speed. So what do you do?
You start kicking.
A fair bit has been made about Mo’unga’s kicking in this game, and it was certainly good, but I was almost more impressed with the Crusaders’ box kicking strategy. I’ll get to Mo’unga in a minute – first, Hall and box kicks.
When the Crusaders’ started getting bogged down with the defensive line speed they were facing, the natural reaction would be to start kicking but the Jaguares backfield is designed to exploit traditional box kicks. Moyano, Moroni and Boffelli are superb operators in the air so the Crusaders’ decided to just give them the ball.
The Crusaders aerially contested only one of Hall’s box kicks. The rest ceded possession but demanded an intense chase and tackle from Reece, Bridge and Havili.
Let them have the ball but time our chase to hit the man on the landing rather than get up in the air to contest. This takes out the effectiveness of the blocking runner – who wipes in front of the jumper pre-jump – and means you can hit the catcher clean before surging over the top of the ruck.
When you see a catcher in this position…
… you’re seeing a player under pressure. When you aerially contest for the ball, there’s a dilution of rights that punish the contesting player depending on a few split-second incidents. If the defending player gets into their air first – as they often do – they usually have all the rights to the contest. The attacking jumper puts himself at risk of unbalancing the defending jumper in the air and forcing a collision that can lead to cards. Also, if the defending catcher takes the ball and lands, they usually have a pocket of ground to work with for transition attacks.
Here, for example;
Firstly, I think the chaser is off-side. Second of all, you can see the inherent risk in aerial contesting on this particular GIF. The Crusaders box kicking strategy took this risk out of the equation.
The Crusaders’ box kick strategy added a little more length and a little more ball in the air time to their box kicks.
This meant that there wouldn’t be a contest in the air but that there would be a dominant collision on the landing.
The Jaguares players running escort lines are trying to block a counter-jump but that’s pretty irrelevant if you’re not trying to counter-jump. When Bonilla lands, he’s got Havilli and Todd swarming all over him and he ends up losing the ball in contact. From there, the Crusaders ended up scoring their first try.
This was a try scored from a box kick, but it doesn’t look like the kind of box kick outcome we’ve become used to. This was a deliberate tactic, too. Even when the Crusaders could have challenged in the air, they chose not to.
Reece could have gone into the air on this – and might have even won the ball given the exposed position of the receiver – but chose to stagger his line and make the hit after landing. The pressure the Crusaders put on the receiver meant that the Jaguares were playing on the back foot thereafter.
They were under so much pressure, they ended up kicking the ball away poorly.
The Crusaders transition defence helped them win this game.
Havilli doesn’t need to get into the air so weaving in and out of the blocking runners doesn’t hurt his chase.They stayed at it all day. Hall kicked six times and Drummond kicked seven times. On almost every occasion, the Crusaders tracked and hit, rather than contested in the air and almost every time they came up with a positive outcome. The box kicking strategy was the key element for the Crusaders in this final.
Mo’unga’s Game
Mo’unga only kicked the ball seven times – six in reality, as one was an up and under on penalty advantage – but one of his kicks were really well executed and showed some excellent game intelligence.
Remember the defensive structure I looked at earlier? Mo’unga’s quick thinking behind the screen exploited the hinge in Jaguares backfield structure.
Moyano stepped up as the Crusaders came across the field – exactly as defined by the system – and the scrappy nature of the pod meant that Mo’unga got a look at stabbing the ball in behind the line, exactly where the space was.
That created a situation that had to be defended negatively, and the Crusaders had possession back on a transition a few phases later. Jaguares got a little lost in the transition reset and Crusaders almost had a chance to hit a counter down the blindside.
Hall’s pass was a little below his usual standards but he was a hair away from putting Reece down the touchline with Taylor, Goodhue and Read in support. It was a low percentage opportunity but it was one created by kicking the ball intelligently.
