[su_dropcap style=”flat” size=”4″]N[/su_dropcap]obody wants to get their pocket picked in Rome. You lose your wallet, your bank cards and, if you’re really dumb like me, a little piece of paper with your actual, literal PPS number written on it. Thankfully my wallet wasn’t snatched, I just left it in my then girlfriend’s apartment in the jeans I was wearing the day before but for that hour I felt like my stomach was fit to jump out my nostrils. The relief when I found it!
The last time Ireland got their pockets picked in Rome back in March 2013, there was no such relief when they got back to their hotel. It was real. Ireland lost 22-15 and Declan Kidney would have his contract as head coach terminated a month later. Five players from that ugly afternoon’s work are involved this weekend – Keith Earls, Iain Henderson, Dave Kilcoyne, Conor Murray and Cian Healy – so the idea that Ireland can’t lose to Italy this Saturday has a few guys present who can say, actually, the worst can happen and have the scars to prove it.

Andy Farrell’s job isn’t on the line in this game but to pretend that a loss here wouldn’t gravely wound his tenure would be to ignore the reality of where we find ourselves right now. The vibe is not good. The craic might be 90 inside the camp for all I know but the last few weeks on the public-facing side of things has been fielding questions about who exactly is to blame for Ireland’s offensive problems all while trying to sell the idea of “improvement” when we’re losing games to the teams we have come to judge ourselves against.
We’ve lost four times in a row to England. We’ve lost twice in a row to France for the first time since 2011. So who cares about Italy? Well, Andy Farrell clearly does and he’s not alone. Both Fabien Galthie and Eddie Jones eschewed teamsheet experimentation for cohesion during a season where very few have the kind of training or time with players that would typically be commonplace.
Ireland, with colossal games incoming against Scotland and England, have selected a side that has the feel of a risky selection but really isn’t in reality. Ryan Baird and Craig Casey are on the bench – as I suspected earlier in the week – and I’m delighted to see them there but every other selection is a solidly first-choice matchday squad selection against what you would assume is the weakest team in the competition.
This is a win first, experiment with youth second selection that I spoke about earlier in the week. In better, more comfortable times, you could well see Ireland look to use their wider Six Nations squad with guys like Chris Farrell, Dave Heffernan, Shane Daly, Ultan Dillane or others getting starts or good minutes off the bench but that isn’t happening here.
Ireland have aims beyond this game and the unit consistency – I expect Beirne to play broadly the same role at #6 as he has done in the second row – built here will be of larger value to Ireland than rotating minutes around the wider squad. In an ideal world for Farrell, Ireland wrap up a bonus point around the 50-minute mark leaving him the mental scope to get significant minutes for Baird and Casey that will satisfy developmental aims while also getting a W on the board.

Italia: 15. Jacopo Trulla, 14. Luca Sperandio, 13. Juan Ignacio Brex, 12. Carlo Canna, 11. Montanna Ioane, 10. Paulo Garbisi, 9. Stephen Varney; 1. Andrea Lovotti, 2. Luca Bigi (c), 3. Marco Riccioni, 4. Marco Lazzaroni, 5. David Sisi, 6. Sebastian Negri, 7. Johann Meyer, 8. Michele Lamaro
A Disposizione: 16. Gianmarco Lucchesi, 17. Cherif Traore’, 18. Giosuè Zilocchi, 19. Niccolò Cannone, 20. Maxime Mbanda’, 21. Callum Braley, 22. Federico Mori, 23. Mattia Bellini
A win is guaranteed here, right?
That’s what everyone seems to think, anyway. Almost all the commentary I’ve seen on this game has either dismissed Italy outright or sneered at those who think that Italy might have more about them than their losing streak suggests. Make no mistake, Italy can mug Ireland in this game if we aren’t careful.
Italy are a deeply incomplete team at the moment but there has been an improvement in their general performances, just not enough relative to the consistent improvement of the other five teams. Since we’re two games into the tournament, we’ve been able to get a good look at how teams have been playing with regards to decisions they make in certain positions. When we look at the playing decisions that both sides have been making, Ireland and Italy look broadly similar. Actually, when you consider they’ve played against the two most physical teams in the tournament in the first two rounds, the fact that they have managed more offensive 22 entries than we have is a sign that on some offensive metrics at least, they might be performing better than Ireland, relatively speaking.
For example, if you look at Italy’s decision’s over the first two games by zone and compare that to the Championship average, you get a picture of a side that tries be expansive in their own half of the field – perhaps to their detriment – and that like to get hands through the ball in situations where they typically lose the territorial battle.

This is to be expected when we consider that they’ve had the most difficult schedule of all the team’s in the first two rounds – at home to France and away to England. Both France and England manage territory quite well through their own decisions with the ball in hand so it would stand to reason that Italy would have a lot of possession in their own half of the field.
Ireland have tended to kick a lot more in our 22 than most of the other nations (10% more than the tournament average) and when you drill into those numbers a bit deeper, you find that 42.4% of kicked possession has been within three phases. Italy, on the other hand, have tended to play more expansively inside three phases but end up kicking 60% of the time when they go above four phases in their own 22.
When you break down how we’ve used the ball in our Q2 – Own 22-50 – we look broadly similar to Italy except we kick 5% more often. When you break down those Q2 numbers, you find that Ireland kick inside 3 phases 14.9% of the time in that Q2 position. Italy, by comparison, only kick 8.9% of the time inside three phases while they play in the same position. 
This is a product of playing with negative territory, especially against England and France who tend to play a lot without the ball in general (even though they have more possession against Italy than what would be typical for them). Italy have typically been forced to play in their own zones of the field against their opposition to date and I don’t expect that to change against Ireland.
As you’d expect, Italy are well aware of this fact and Franco Smith has structured his attack to play in an environment where they will generally have a lot of possession in their own half. If you lose territory battles regularly, you have to be comfortable playing in your own half of the field.
Smith’s Cheetah’s side of the last few years was notable for having three ball-playing handlers at 10, 12 & 13. The side that beat Munster 40-16 in Bloemfontein two years ago had Tian Schoeman, Louis Fouche and Benhard Janse Van Rensburg – all players who would be comfortable playing as a #10.
For Italy, Smith has looked to use Garbisi and Canna as double pivots at #10/#12 with Brex slotting in at #13 as a combo of smooth handling and a punchy carrying game. As you might expect, Italy are a side that likes to move the ball to the wide channels on their possessions and, through Garbisi, Canna and Brex, they have capable handlers that can move the ball to the wider channels.
It isn’t just about width with Italy, it’s also about depth. You’ll often see Italy passing quite deep on their openside structures. Here’s a good still example from the French game. Garbisi takes the ball off a sloped three-pod screen and slings a deep pass back to #13 Marco Zanon, who’s another player comfortable playing at flyhalf in a midfield positon.

What this does is give Italy’s outside backline (or wide forwards) space to run into at a distance that is outside a comfortable blitzing range for the opposition. Basically, France have to travel a long way before they meet the Italian runners so Italy are able to, in theory at least, dictate the terms of the engagement. That opens up an offload opportunity for the layered runners to run into static or slowing defenders.
When we play this sequence out, we can see how the deep strike lays the table for some variation – a reversal, carries off #9 and finally a powerful step and break by Garbisi when he takes the ball flat.
Garbisi gives Italy this option because he has the step, acceleration and power to make and extend a linebreak like this if you drift off him. Italy will mix this deep ball design with flat forward action – they’re actually pretty good at chewing through the gainline when they get decent ruck speed – and a constant breaking and short ball threat by Varney off these flat forward collisions.
They will keep going back to deep runners, however, because it gives them space and time to make decisions. They will rotate through pods forwards and then play any opportunities that pop up but when they release, it’ll usually be with deep options lurking far beyond the range of the Irish press.
They pattern their play – and not the location of these examples – on these principles. Flat forward pressure to find position, halfback breaking on space, but always another handler lying deep with a forward or two dropping back to add options.
You can see them stitch those options together here in the English 22-50. It ends with a deep ball to Canna who’s got the space and time to kick it over the top for a relatively decent gain.
For Ireland, the key will be kicking contestably, hemming in Italy’s deep play without over blitzing and tackling air, and hitting the Italians on transition runbacks. Nobody kicks less than Italy in open play but they have the 2nd longest kicking distance over the first two rounds.
This means that when they kick, it’s usually off #10 and it’s usually as long as they can get the ball – either off the field or deep into the backfield. This opens up transition opportunities for Keenan, Larmour, Lowe and the Irish midfield on the run back against the Italian transition defence. Ireland have not been hugely efficient in this area of the game so far under Farrell/Catt but they’ll rarely get as many running opportunities as they will in this game.
Ireland needs to kick well, hold Italy in their own Q2 and punish their mistakes when we get the opportunity. If our lineout runs effectively – and it’s currently the least effective in the tournament – we should have mauling and maul break opportunities on top of a striking game that stacks up well with this Italian midfield.
It’s a banana peel that we won’t get any credit for winning, regardless of how it’s done, but the key will be staying patient, continuing our solid scrummaging to prevent any drastic loss of position off the many handling errors I expect here, and taking our opportunities on the transition when they appear.



