[su_dropcap style=”flat” size=”4″]M[/su_dropcap]urray Kinsella wrote an excellent article on Jacob Stockdale this week that covered some of what I was going to cover with this article so I decided to scale out a little to focus on backfield defensive management as a whole rather than focusing on Jacob Stockdale as an individual.

I suppose my main point is that it isn’t just down to the individual. As much as we can look at one guy losing an aerial duel or making an error in an ocean of green space, it’s as much to do with the system the team is using as anything else. Are you playing a 13+2? A 14+1?

When we consider the “backfield”, I think we’ve got to specify what exactly we’re referring to from a positional sense. The backfield isn’t just the giant space behind the main defensive line, it’s a collection of zones relative to where the ball is on the field.

Here’s the zone layout on a defensive backfield with the primary defensive line camped around halfway.

The defensive layout changes as the primary defensive line moves closer to the try line, but if you’re outside your 10m line, I break it down into these rough areas of coverage. As a general principle, you want your backfield coverage to be context-specific relative to your depth from the primary defensive line and your ability to reach a zone comfortably.

If you’re playing a 13+2 with dropping wingers and a covering #9, the backfield coverage should look a little like this with a dead central offensive ruck position.

When the ball moves to one side, the backfield will then rotate around to guard the spaces with 9/10 in this system moving between the primary line and their coverage positions if the situation demands.

Let’s have a look at the approximate positioning when the ball moves across to the right side of the field and watch the relationship between the backfield defenders change relative to the position of the ball/ruck.

Once you’re in this position, you can switch up certain aspects depending on the attacking team’s behaviour. If they look to box kick, you can leave your fullback in the backfield directly opposite the kicking ruck to maximise their advantage on the aerial duel with your winger and covering #9 dropping back to affect a blocking line on the chasers and support the fullback after the aerial contest.

If everyone makes good decisions, you can manage these moments quite well and allow players to execute their skills without worrying too much about geography.

Here’s an example of how it can wrong with just a few issues and poor decisions.

Things to watch;

1. Keenan and Murray drop back to block the lane for Stockdale. Conway dips into the backfield on the opposite wing.
2. Sexton covers the central backfield space while Stockdale attacks the kick with Murray and Keenan blocking off the lane of any direct French attack line.
3. Sexton moves into the primary defensive line to make up numbers when he sees forwards on the edge of the line after the ball is not secured.

My main issue here is that Stockdale didn’t dominate the duel on the sideline, even if we look at Rattez possibly being in touch according to the law. You can’t wait for an AR to get his rulebook and microscope out in these situations, you must stop that ball from coming back infield even it means conceding a scrum or a lineout.

Once the ball is back infield, Sexton makes a decision to move into the primary defensive line to try and kill the progression of the ball across the field but when he does that, it demands certain behaviours in backfield coverage.

Here’s what should have happened.

Stockdale should have immediately burst across the field after the French ruck to cover 2/3 allowing Conway to push up into 5 and the primary defensive line. Visually it’s a bit messy, but I want you to see the zones of coverage and how each player should be covering space.

But he didn’t. Stockdale stayed too long in 8/4 as the play was developing and when the ball broke across the field, he was out of position. Sexton’s decision to run up into the primary line meant that if Conway did the same, the entire defensive right backfield (1 and 2) would be completely exposed to a kick through from Fickou.

Here’s how it played out.

1. Look at Sexton’s high blitz on Bouthier – if he makes this read, he has to stop the ball but doesn’t.
2. Look at Murray covering across in the secondary.
3. Look at Conway’s isolated spot in the backfield and how much distance Stockdale has to make up to cover on the inside pass to Dupont.

We know that Stockdale didn’t rotate to the centre quickly enough because you can see him on the far wing at the start of Fickou’s break when he should have been much closer to the break by that point.

I show where he was at the start of the break here, along with where I would have preferred him to be if he’d rotated earlier.

Because he didn’t cover the appropriate spacing, that affected everything else. It’s the gift and the curse of playing in the back three. You won’t take as much defensive contact but your decisions of where to position yourself can be make or break decisions on a defensive sequence.

Ireland still seem a little unsure on our backfield roles in some ways. Sexton has to direct Keenan pretty strongly on this phase to get back as a blocker on a deep-lying Stockdalebut everything else looks OK. Conway is in the central role on this rotation and Henshaw fills the role of the edge defender in the same way that a winger would be expected to.

The same action happened throughout the game and Henshaw’s ability to dip into the backfield was something that showed up again and again.

This is an example of the system working exactly as it should;

Conway’s drop line prevents a clean line of attack for France, Keenan rotates across the middle, Henshaw drops back outside and Stockdale takes the ball handily, exactly as the system is designed to do during settled phase play.

Set Piece Set-Up

The arrangement is slightly different on the set-piece. Most teams tend to use a +2 system on most lineout and scrums that are outside the 22.

The primary line of the backs (plus any extra forwards) make up the main press line with the outside winger operating in a role where they press up off the edge with enough balance to be able to press hard into the offensive line and peel back on a kick.

The fullback covers the outside space for a potential crossfield kick before advancing up into the primary line if the ball progresses across that far.

The covering winger guards three spaces;

1. The initial space behind the maul for any action up the touchline or chipped over the top.
2. If that is removed as a threat, he moves across the field to cover the lane between the edge of the lineout and the 10 for a break or a grubber through.
3. He then goes to the posts and covers anything that comes over the top of the primary line if the fullback goes into the primary line. He’ll then progress back across the field as the winger/fullback recover position.

You can see the action working quite well here against England;

The only blunder here was Larmour not calling the mark but other than that, this is how the system should work. On scrums in your own half, the process is mostly the same but with variable defendable space. If a scrum is in the middle of the field, for example, you’ll have to defend both sides with roughly equivalent numbers but if the scrum is closer to the flanks, the setup is mostly the same as the lineout with the scrumhalf giving directions on breaking threats/position to the winger defending the space behind him.

But the positioning of the fullback is crucial in these moments too. Let’s have a look at how this scrum played out.

Ntamack’s kick in behind is really good but Stockdale’s positioning is too aggressive, in my opinion. His backfield coverage gives Ntamack a kicking lane that is almost sure to turn Stockdale and send him running back towards his own try line which is exactly what we don’t want in this situation.

If Stockdale doesn’t overrun his position, he gives Ntamack the yellow line which, barring a bad bounce, would concede ground but you’d live with it. Instead, Stockdale seems overly interested in the winger and gives up the blue line for Ntamack to kick deep into the 22.

Stockdale has to turn, reshape and track a bouncing ball with his back to the chasers and, under pressure, he fumbles but just about manages to avoid giving up a scrum.

Off the next lineout, France showed the difficulty of transitioning from set-piece backfield coverage to settled phase play coverage and how your centre-field numbers influence the entire process.

After Ireland exited after the Stockdale misstep, France went wide off the lineout. Keep an eye out for Stockdale striking up into the primary defensive line in-line with the system early but then pay attention to the gaps that Ireland give up in the primary defensive line as they struggle to contain the French.

See how that collapses the spacing? There are 13 Irish players in the primary defensive line here so that means Stockdale covering the right defensive backfield with Keenan offscreen on the left defensive side. For me, Stockdale is a little too far right here relative to where the ruck is.

He will have to cover a lot of ground here – the compressed Irish primary defensive line means that Keenan must shoot up on Rattez once France take another ruck.

That gives Stockdale time to get across the field to cover but it’s hurried. He’s in position to claim the ball – and even make a counter-attack if he makes a dominant take – but instead, he makes a critical error as he advances on the grubber kick and Doris commits a penalty try infringement as he tries to mop up the situation.

Stockdale certainly has what it takes to be a quality fullback. For the most part, his kicking game and attacking prowess are already there but it’s the positional discipline and instinct that are, for me, holding him back. Those issues won’t show up against every opponent but when Ireland are struggling to control the gainline, any mistake in the backfield becomes more and more expensive.

He needs time and minutes in the position to work out the dimensions of the job or he might never be what he’s capable of.