[su_dropcap style=”flat” size=”4″]L[/su_dropcap]ast summer, I wrote a piece on these pages called “For Every Wall A Hammer” and it examined how one might use Rugby League concepts in attack to counteract the prevalence of Rugby League style defence in Rugby Union over the last decade.
In the year since that article, quite a bit has changed. Rugby will be trialling the 50/22 law in a number of competitions – an idea that mirrors league’s 40/20 – but the biggest change, in my opinion, has been the change in focus around the breakdown which, if it holds long term, will radically reshape how the game will be played relative to how we have come to know union over the last decade.
If this new focus on the actual breakdown laws holds for the long term, I think the flat three-man forward pod off #9 is dead in the water as a basic attacking shape – the risks of securing the ball are just too high with a pod system so reliant on the concept that the jackal must “survive the cleanout”.
Have a look at this example from this season’s Champions Cup. Leinster are on an earlier advantage but that isn’t relevant to the incident we’re looking at.
It looks like a pretty bog-standard progression phase, right? Except, under the new interpretations of the breakdown, this is a penalty to Benetton for Blue #5 side entry and possibly another for going off his feet. When you look at the moment before contact, there was very little else that could have happened.
When the Benetton tackler stops Toner on the advantage line, Ryan is left with a timing issue because of how flat he is relative to Toner. To come back around and enter this ruck legally would take time and space that he doesn’t have.
The blue arrow shows the line Ryan should have taken to be legal under the new interpretation. The red line below shows his actual angle of entry.
He is forced to go straight off his feet to prevent the two Benetton players attacking Toner on the floor, even though Ryan and Porter would have time to remove the cleaner under the old “survive the cleanout” concept. Only White #7 makes a go for the ball after Ryan’s entry because, under the old regulations, there was no value in committing to a jackal attempt here. Leinster had two heavy cleanout options close by who didn’t need to enter the ruck legally – rather, just make an attempt to not be blatantly illegal – and when you didn’t “survive the cleanout” you would be out of the next defensive phase. There was much more value in Bram Steyn looking to counter ruck Ryan to possibly detach the ball.
This kind of scenario was commonplace under the interpretation that we’ve become used to over the last decade. Here’s another relatively “flat” pod of three off #9.
There are three penalties here.
There is a penalty against Porter – White #19 squares up before entry, gets hands on the ball legally and Porter fails to release. You could argue that there are also two penalties against Van Der Flier and Ryan for side entry as neither player “squares up” before angling in on the jackal.
This is a direct result of the relatively flat alignment of the pod and the target area for the carry. The lateral pod gives you a tip on pass target, in theory, but there’s no real scope for that in this context. Ryan is mainly there as an “eye threat” – a player the defence has to pay attention to in theory but Ryan is there to help create a one on one collision for Porter with the threat of a pass and then clean out the ruck by whatever means necessary to generate clean quick ball.
The target for the carry is crucial too. If Leinster – or any attacking side, really – can successfully retain these narrow carries into the strong core of the opposition defensive line, then they will have an opportunity to work an isolation in space for their wide attackers. Think of it like breaking the pitch into thirds; you hit the 1/3 mark to open up the 2/3 because the opposition has to respect your blindside.
In this scheme, NINE Benetton defenders are dead on the play. One man is in the ruck, two defenders have to guard McGrath at the breakdown (with Larmour lurking), three players are guarding the blindside and that leaves three centre-field defenders guarding Healy and Toner with the target three red defenders spaced across 25m of space on the far wing.
If Leinster can commit the centre of Benetton’s defence and get the ball to Ruddock in a timely manner, they’ll have a 3 v 3 in 20+ metres of space with a tonne of forward momentum. You’d back your attacking wide players to make good ground in that context every time.
None of this happens without the initial ruck win off #9.
It’s my contention that the new ruck interpretations will make playing mostly off #9 in short-range forays an incredibly high-risk gameplan. Under the old interpretations, the balance of risk on those carries off #9 was heavily tilted towards the defending team. It’s the one area of the field where the defence have a solid defensive wall of players consistently and a plethora of second arriving jackals close at hand but the need to survive the cleanout – a period of 2/3 seconds where the tackled player can hang onto the ball while the jackal attempts to absorb massive, multi-vectored cleanout attempts – heavily weighted that area of the game towards the attacking side.
Under the new interpretations, I don’t think there’s any way that defensive sides don’t commit more resources to attack defensive breakdowns, especially successive phases off #9 or with tight forward interplay.
Four months ago, this is play-on to the Hurricanes. Today, Yellow #6 and #17 are too separated from the ball carrier to prevent the jackal from getting hands-on and effecting a full penalty turnover. The entire penalty is won inside one second of in-game time.
In this environment, the risk of a successful jackal or an offensive infringement like side entry/off-feet/double movement increases with every carry close to the location of the previous ruck. This was a pretty normal looking hit up off #9 but this kind of spacing from the ball carrier is something that we’ll see less off in this new environment.
Red #20 is arguably in a position that could be blown for side entry but the responsibility has tilted towards the ball carrier and the cleaners to be way accurate with their cleaning lines and ball presentation than they have been in the past.
In that environment, I think we’ll see more and more phase moving to the middle space off wider ruck positions. If the blue circle is the current most common phase target off #9 from a wide ruck for White #9, I think the yellow circle must be the logical next step.
Defences will still have to cover the space close to the ruck because it’s the most dangerous place to concede ground but I think the shapes we see there from an offensive perspective will have to change.
A shape like this makes a lot of sense to me.
The pink box is the most interesting.
This new focus on breakdown accuracy will mean that I think we’ll see a hybrid type of forward appearing. This player must be able to accurately and quickly clean out any ruck off #9 from directly behind the ball carrier, maximising the legality of entry. This player must be capable of taking a pivot pass from the screen and either carry around the corner – with #5 cleaning in this instance – or be comfortable spinning a pass to wider players.
We’ve also going to want to see a lot of horizontal movement and agility from a #10 as we move forward. Our halfbacks have to have the range to find each other at distance and #10, in particular, will find their skillset and physical ability to move across the field challenged by these interpretations, sooner rather than later.
I think the #10 will become a creative link player – even more so than now – that will have to flit between the pink pod and the red pod and play a key role in both using their breaking ability, passing, offloading and tactical/offensive kicking.
The red pod – in my scheme it’s got four players in it – will have be multifaceted when carrying the ball off #10. The forwards and backs involved will have to be comfortable in all parts of the game; carrying, cleaning out and passing/offloading to deep-lying runners.
The Canes showed some inventive shapes against the Crusaders on Sunday. This is, essentially, a five-man midfield pod with Laumape showing as a late-arriving decoy to set up the swivel pass to Tiatia in the second layer.
It didn’t quite work in this instance but you can see how Tiatia would have linked up with the edge attackers. This kind of deep screening shape with serious pressure being put on the forwards handling ability will have to become the norm.
I think we’re going to see more use of pivot screens at the edge of the attacking line. Have a look at this from the NRL – Eels vs Manly.
This is a play that’s triggered right on the tackle line so it could easily translate to an edge space in union.
The action is designed to compress the edge defence on the last heavy ball carrier while opening up the pass back inside with a pivot screen.
It doesn’t quite work out for the Eels here but this rotating triangle of pass options could really work in a union setting, especially on a wide play off #10. The screened back looks dead on the play until the pivot and pass back from the carrier and this was only a metre or two away from really opening Manly up.
***
In my opinion, I think these interpretations are going to make the need for depth – discussed in last year’s For Every Wall A Hammer article – more important. You can see the beginnings of it in some of the rugby from Aotearoa this weekend.
Look at this attacking phase from that same Paramatta Eels and Manly game.
Look at the verticality on those screens to create the wide isolation for the edge attackers.
Now watch this from the Crusaders at the weekend.
Two decoy forward screens and two passes brought the play to exactly where it would be most dangerous – beyond the furthest advancing blitz defender and outside him.
The pink line is the position of the original ruck and the yellow space shows how the Canes defensive advance has been drawn out by the layers of screened runners.
The pass from Goodhue to Jordan was a bit off where it needed to be in this instance. Jordan’s readjustment cut off the possibility of a pass to Ennor that would have almost certainly lead to a try or at least a serious crack at one.
Getting this kind of depth while reducing the distance between rucks will be a key part of effective attacking structures. Every ruck will have to be resourced legally 9 times out of 10 on the offensive side of the ball if the way it’s being refereed in New Zealand translates up here. The best way to maximise that, in my opinion, is by spreading out your phases in a way that carries the ball into areas with less defensive traffic and more isolated jackal threats. You can progress the ball from there. I think the team that recognises this change first and reacts the quickest will see the most success in the short to medium term. It’ll certainly be an interesting watch.
